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The 1980s were marked by a greater emphasis on debt
financing by corporations. This shift away from equity
financing is apparent in the rise in the aggregate, book-
value, debt-to-equity ratio of nonfinancial corporations.
As shown in Chart 1, aggregate, book-value leverage
began rising in 1984, corresponding with an unprece-
dented surge in the net retirement of equities that many
attribute to the increase in corporate restructuring in
the 1980s.
The decade also was punctuated by two key tax reform
lawsthat brought about major changes in marginal income
taxrates. The 1981 taxreformact, forexample,reduced the
maximum marginal tax rate on ordinary, personal income
from 70 percent to 50 percent. The 1986taxreform actfur-
ther reduced the maximum rate on ordinary, personal in-
come, lowered the maximum tax rate on corporate profits,
and raised the maximum marginal tax rate capital gains.'
With this combination of developments, it is only natu-
ral to look for a link between the income-tax rate changes
and the shift away from equity and toward debt financing
by nonfinancial corporations during the 1980s. This paper
examines this connection. It differs from previous studies
in two ways. First, it considers the effects on corporate
leverage of changes in nominal interest rates working
through tax incentives as well as the direct effects of
changes in income-tax rates. The analysis in this paper
suggests that tax-related incentives toward leverage in-
crease with nominal interest rates, and that this interest
rate link had a pronounced influence on income-tax in-
centives for corporate leverage in the 1980s. Moreover,
changes in income-tax rates, in theory, cause the nominal
interest rate to change, thereby partly offsetting the direct
effects of income-tax rate changes.
This paper also differs from previous studies in that
it evaluates the relationship between income-tax incen-
tives and aggregate, market-value leverage among nonfi-
nancial corporations. The empirical evidence indicates
that market-value leverage among nonfinancial corpora-
tions in the latter part of the 1980swasgreater than can be
accounted forby income-tax incentives alone. This finding
is consistent with the predominant view in the literature
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*Basedon seasonally-adjusted quarterly dataat annualratesfor
nonfinancial corporations.
**Based on annual datafornonfinancial corporations.
relaxed antitrust standards, improvements in "takeover
technology," andhigherlevels offree cashflow, ratherthan
income-tax incentives, contributed to higherleverage in
the 1980s. 2
This latter result is of particular interest in that the
supposed boost to corporate leverage in 1980s is not
apparentinthelevel ofmarket-value leverage among non-
financial corporations. Thispointisillustrated inChart2,
whichtraces the market-value debt-to-equity ratio (D/E)
fornonfinancial corporations. Theestimates ofleverage in
thechartarebasedonFlowofFunds andNational Income
Accounts data." Thechartshows thatmarket-value corpo-
rate leverage hastended toincrease sincetheearly1950s.
Themostapparent run-up in leverage, however, occurred
intheearly1970s, notthe1980s. Infact,theaverage level
ofmarket-value leverage forthe1980s was aboutthesame
as thatforthe second halfof the 1970s.4
Thepaperpresents amodel relatingthemarginal benefit
ofcorporate leverage to income taxratesandthenominal
interestrate. Thetheoretical framework isusedtoexamine
howand whyincome-tax incentives forleverage changed
over time. Theestimated empirical relationship between
income-tax incentives andcorporate leverage thenis used
to determine the contribution of income-tax incentives to












52 56 60 64 68 72 76 80 84 89
Basedon seasonally-adjusted quarterly datafornonfinancial corporations.














From(4), it can be seenthat the initialinvestor would
have an incentive to usedebt financing as long as thetax
rate on interestincome is less than the effective rate on
equityincome-thatis,aslong astp < [tc+t/1-tc )] ' The
tax rate on equityincome reflects the double taxation of
corporate profits-firstwhenthecorporation pays taxes on
earnings andagainwhen personal taxes are paidon divi-
dends orcapitalgains. Interestondebt,ontheotherhand,
is tax-deductible forcorporations, and, thus,istaxed only
once, as ordinary, personal income.
When interestincome istaxed atalower ratethanequity
income, then, thevalue of thefirm is positively relatedto
the amount of debt financing. For the case in whichthe
initial investor issues debt to finance the project, the
marginal benefit ofdebtversusequityfinancing is
g=aV D = R{(1- -(1 tc)[w(l- +(1 w)(1-tk )]} >0. (5)
aD 1+r
For an existing corporation, (5) is the marginal tax
benefit fromusingdebt(ratherthanequity) tofinance new
investment. 9 The expression shows that the income-tax
incentives forleveraging areafunction ofthemarginal tax
rates as wellas thenominal interestrate.
Thereason thenominal interestratehasaneffectis the
presence oftheinflation premium. 10From(5), theeffectof
inflation, and, thus, of the nominal interest rate, on the
incentives forleveraging, holding taxes constant, is:
The value of the firm with debt financing, then, can
be derived from (1) and (3). This is accomplished by
adjusting the before-tax claimsof theequityholderin (1)
bythebefore-tax claimsofthedebtholders andadding the
after-tax value of debt. The value of the firm with debt
financing is:
!-D+(Y-DR){(l U[w(1- +(1 w)(l-tk)J)
VD = ------...:-----=---.!.:.------...:::......:...-'=------
l+r
where r is the real after-tax required return. The re-
quiredreal after-tax returnisexogenous and applies to all
investors.
Toincorporate theeffects ofleverage, theinitialinvestor
is assumed to issue debt to other (outside) investors in
Period 1in someproportion, a, of the initialinvestment,
where0 < a < 1.6 Thenominal rate-of-return onthedebt,
R, isthesumoftherealrequired rate-of-return andtherate
of inflation adjusted fortaxes on interestincome, so that
R = r+p (2)
1- tp
Thisexpression is theDarby(1975) respecification of the
Fisherequation,andit implies thatanincrease (decrease)
inthe marginaltaxrateonordinary, personal income will
raise(lower) thebefore-tax, nominal interestrateondebt.7




whereD is both market-value and book-value of debt."
Income Taxes and Leverage
Toillustratehowincome taxconsiderations canaffect a
firm'schoiceregarding market-value leverage, thevalue of
afirm(project) financed onlywithequity iscompared with
the value of thesamefirm financed alsowith some debt.
Assuming twotimeperiods, letI betheinitialinvestment,
Ybe thenet nominal returnfromtheprojectin thesecond
period,andp betheinflation ratefrom Period 1toPeriod 2.
Forsimplicity, it isassumed thatallinvestors have perfect
foresight.
All investors are assumed to face flat tax rates on
ordinary, personal income (tp), corporate profits (tJ, and
personal,equityincome (ts)' Furthermore, profits arepaid
bothin theformof dividends andcapitalgainsinpropor-
tions wand (1 - w), respectively, where 0 S w:; 1. The
marginal taxrateonpersonal, equityincome isdefined as
the weighted average of an individual's marginal taxrate
onordinary, personal income andthemarginal tax rateon
capitalgains, suchthatts = wtp + (1-w)tk , where tk is
thetaxrate on capitalgains. 5
With100 percent equityfinancing, thevalue ofthefirm
in Period 1is the discounted value of thegross, after-tax,
realreturnin Period 2:
_ 1+ {(l-tJ [w(1 tp )+(1-w)(1-un-pI
VE - 1+r ' (1)
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 5or
{
(l-tc)[w(l- +(l-W)(l-tk )] }






Fora givenafter-tax rateofreturn,themarginal benefit of
leverage depends on the corporate taxrate, but notonthe
othertaxrates, when w= 1.
From(5), it alsofollows thatthe incentives forissuing
debtversus equitytofinance newinvestment arepositively
related to the tax rates on corporate profits and capital
gains-that is,
dg = R{w(1-tp)+(1-w)(1-tk)} >0
dte 1+r
or, in themorefamiliar form,
(r+p)te
g= 1+r .
effectof a change in tp on the incentives for leveraging,
however, willbe less negative thanthat suggestedby the
directeffect. Thisistruesinceachangeinthepersonal tax
rate alters the before-tax, nominal rate of retum.P The
effectof the changein the nominal interest rate is repre-
sentedbythefirst setoftermsontheright-hand-sideof(7).
Thissetoftermsispositive forallowable values of w, and
increases withw. Ignoring thefeedback oftaxratesonthe
nominal interestrate, then,would leadtoanoverstatement
ofthe effectof a change in tpo
Thus,thesignofthederivative in(7) isnegative aslong
assomecorporate profits arerealizedintheformofcapital
gains (W<1).15 A higher marginal tax rate on ordinary
income, then, would leadto lessdebtand lowerleverage.
Likewise, a lower tax rate would lead to more debt and
higherleverage.
However, if profits are paid out only in dividends
(w= 1), then, changes in a flat marginal tax rate on
ordinary, personal income would not affect the marginal










An increase ininflation (riseinthenominal rateofreturn)
reinforces thepositive effectonthevalue ofthefirm from
issuingdebt,assuming thatthetaxrateoninterestincome
is less than the effective rate on equity income." The
reason for this is that the higher nominal income due to
higherinflation is taxedata lower ratewhen it is takenas
interestincome ratherthanasequityincome.
The unambiguous sign in (6) in part stems from the
absence of "bracket creep," which is assumed away by
havingflattaxrates. Witha progressive taxratestructure
andnoinflation indexation, tp would risewithinflation due
to bracket creep. If the marginal tax rate on ordinary
income rises due to inflation, the theoretical effects of
inflationontheincentives forleveraging areambiguous. 12
In the U.S., the 1981 tax reform act introduced inflation
indexation (effective in1985), butinprioryears themargi-
naltaxratesforindividuals increasedwithinflation. Inany
case, the empirical evidence in the nextsection indicates
that thebracket creepeffecthasnotdominated.
The effect of a change in the tax rate on ordinary,
personalincome ontheincentives forafirm toleverage can
be shown formally bydifferentiating (5) withrespecttotp '
This yields
ag aR {(1- +(l-w)(l-tk )])
atp atp
Asbackground tothediscussion intheempirical section
on theeffects of interestratesandtaxratesonincome-tax
incentives forleveraging, it is usefulto consider the two
setsoftermsontheright-handsideof(7). Thesecond setof
terms on the right-hand-side of (7) represents the direct
effect of a change in tp on the marginal benefit from an
increaseinleverage. Thistermisnegative forallallowable
values ofw-thatis,0S wS 1.Thisdirecteffectgenerally
is what analysts have in mind when arguing that lower
marginal tax rates on ordinary, personal income favor
greatercorporate leverage. 13
When debt is issued to outside investors, the overall
and
dg R(1-te)(1- w) (9)
:.l = I >0. utk +r
A highercorporate taxrateor higherpersonal taxrateon
capitalgains would lead to an increase in debt and lever-
age. 16Thereason isthehighertaxrateslowerthereturnon
equityincome relative to thaton interestincome.
Determination of Corporate Leverage
When financing new investment an investor would
choose alldebtwhenthetaxrateonequityincome ishigher
6 Economic Review / Fall1990whereginthiscontextistheexpected marginal income-tax
benefit from leveraging. Ifthisequality does notholdata
given point in time, a corporation could be expected to
adjust its leverage over time to eliminate the difference
between the expected marginal benefit and the marginal
cost.
would serve to offset the tax shield advantages of debt,
and, thus, limitDIE ratios.
For many corporations, of course, agency problems
exist between managers and non-manager stockholders.
Forsuchfirms, muchoftheequityaswellasthedebtcan
beviewed asoutside financing. Withagency costs associ-
atedbothwithoutside equity and debt, suchcosts would
notnecessarily increase monotonically withleverage. Jen-
senandMeckling argue that,foragivenvolume ofinside
financing andfirm size, totalagencycostsshould falland
thenrise as the fraction financed through outside equity
rises.>' In this context, a firm's DIE mix, in principle,
couldbedetermined uniquely withouttaxeffects.
Evenso, theincome taxeffects discussed above canbe
important influences onfirms' debt andequity choices. 22
Theoptimal DIEratioforacorporation should balance the
marginal effects from leveraging related to income-tax
factors andothertaxandnon-tax factors. With uncertainty,
therewould beanexpected marginal benefit from leverag-
ingassociated withincome tax considerations comparable
to (5). Given that the expected marginal benefit from
leverage ispositive, inequilibrium theexpected netmargi-
nal effectof all otherfactors on leverage mustjust offset
thatbenefit.
Assuming thattheexpected net marginal costof other
factors is some function fO of the level of leverage,
represented by the DIE ratio, and a vector of othervari-




(or pureequity) is not the observed pattern of corporate
financing, however, sootherfactors mustaffect the choice
ofequity financing versus debtfinancing. Corporate lever-
agedecisions, forexample, canbeaffected bynon-debt tax
shields associated with depreciation deductions and in-
vestment tax credits. DeAngelo andMasulis (1980) point
outthatnon-debt taxshields offset theincome-tax advan-
tageofleverage and couldbe influential enough to deter-
mineDIE ratios forindividual firms. 17
Non-tax considerations also can affect leverage; many
of these make leverage more costly, and work to offset
income-tax incentives favoring debtfinancing. Anoften-
citednon-tax impediment to debtfinancing is the costof
bankruptcy. Theargument is thatdead weight losses are
associated withafirm becoming insolvent andnotmeeting
its debt obligations.P Everything else equal, at some
degreeofleverage, furtherincreases indebtfinancing will
raisetheprobability ofbankruptcy andtheexpectedcostof
bankruptcy. Hence, bankruptcy costs would bias a firm
toward equity financing, and changes in expected bank-
ruptcy cost would be negatively related to changes in
DIE ratios.
Costs associated with information asymmetries and
agency problems alsocanbeaffected by, andintumaffect,
thedegree ofcorporate leverage. 19Inthecaseofanowner-
managed firm, themanager (agent), whohas more infor-
mation about the firm than do outside investors, has
incentives to increase the firm's risk to the detriment of
the debtholders (principals). Expost, such incentives for
risk-taking will increase with leverage.P In Jensen and
Meckling (1976), the monitoring and other agency costs
associated with outside financing will be borne by the
ownerandreducethevalue ofthefirm relative toitsvalue
with100 percentinsidefinancing. To theextentthatinside
financing is identified with equity and outside financing
with debt, information asymmetries and agency costs
g - f(DIE, X) = 0, (10)
II.Empirical Results
In this section the theoretical constructs developed
above are used to evaluate empirically how income-tax
considerations for corporate leverage have behaved and
how these incentives have affected aggregate leverage
among nonfinancial corporations inthe1980s. The analy-
sisproceeds first byevaluating howincome-tax incentives
per sechangedovertimeandthenbyrelating thechanges
in aggregate, corporate leverage to theestimated income-
taxincentives.
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Estimated Income-TaxIncentives
To evaluate quantitatively how and why income-tax
incentives have changed overtime, estimates ofthemargi-
nalvalue ofissuing corporate debtcanbederived byusing
(5). Usingtheundiscounted value, themarginal gainfrom
leveraging is defined as:
G=R{(l-tp ) - (1-U[w(1-tp ) +(1-w)(1-tk )u (11)
7Using (11) requires choosing an appropriate before-tax
interestrateandestimating therelevant taxrates.Thenom-
inalinterestrateselected isthe10-yearTreasury bondrate.
UsingaTreasury security rate, ratherthanacorporate bond
rate,tendstounderstate thetaxeffectsinceexpected rates-
of-returns should bepositively relatedtorisk.Ontheother
hand, using acorporateinterest rate would overstate the
taxeffectsinceit would bethepromised ratherthantheex-
pectedrate-of-return. Inanycase, theempirical results are
notverysensitive totheuseofeitheraninterestrateoncor-
poratebondsoroneon alonger-termTreasury instrument.
Theestimated taxrates should reflect the marginal tax
ratesoftheinvestors thatwould holdtheadditional debtor
equity issued. With regard to the stock of outstanding
securities, weobserved thatindividual investors holdboth
equity and debt(apparently for diversification motives),
whichmeans that, forestimating theaverage value ofthe
income-tax incentive, theappropriate tax-ratesforpersonal
income(bothinterest andequity) areweighted averages of
thetaxratesfortheinvestors holding corporate securities.
Ifitisfurtherassumed thatnew debtandequity isacquired
by investors in different taxbrackets in the same propor-
tion as the outstanding stocks, the average marginal tax
ratesalsoareappropriate forevaluating theeffects oftaxes
onthemarginal value ofleverage. Inthissection, then,(11)
is evaluated usingestimates oftheweighted average mar-
ginal taxratesforpersonal income-interest, dividends,
and capital gains, along with the maximum tax rate on
corporate profits.
Forordinary, personal income, separate estimates were
made for tax rates on interest income and for those on
dividend income.P This is necessary because debt and
equity instruments are not held in the same proportions
among investors subject to different marginal income-tax
rates. Equities tend to be held by investors with higher
incomes. The weighted-average marginal tax rates were
derived through 1986 based on data fromIndividual In-
come Tax Returns forthe appropriate years. Theaverage
marginal rate oninterest income isbasedon thedistribu-
tionofinterestincome across adjustedgross income cate-
gories. Thisassumes thatthedistributionofcorporatedebt
holdings isproportional tothedistribution ofalldebt.The
average marginal tax rate on dividends •. is •.based on.ehe
distribution of dividend income across adjusted gross
income categories.>' The estimates after 1986werede-
rivedby applying theweights basedon1986 income data
tothemarginal taxratesforthedifferent income categories
foreachyear.
Thetaxrateoncapital gainsisbasedonestimates oHhe
average marginal rate from the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO).25 TheCBOestimates represent taxrateson
realized capitalgains. Thecommon assumption isthatthe
effective tax rate is considerably lower than the rate on
realized gainsbecause ofthegeneral deferral oftaxes, the
selective realization of losses andgains, andtheincrease
of basis at death. The usual convention is to set the
effective capital gains taxrateequal to one-fourth therate
onrealized capitalgains. 26
Inestimating theaverage marginal personal taxrateon
equityincome, wusually issetequaltoone-halfbasedon
the observation that, historically, corporate profits have
been distributed about equally through dividends and
capitalgains.27 Overtheperiodfrom 1950 through 1988,
for example, the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits
among nonfinancial corporations averaged just about50
percent.
Chart 3
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Basedon seasonally-adjusted quarterly datafornonfinancial corporations.
Economic Review / Fall1990Chart3, however, indicates thatusingafixedvalue forw
may not be appropriate. The dividend to profits ratio
jumpedin the 1980s, averaging 72percentafter 1981 and
44 percent from 1950 through 1981. The significance of
thischangedepends onwhether thehigherratioisperma-
nentor temporary. Thehigherratiocouldreflect aperma-
nent endogenous response to the shift in tax rates in the
1980s, which narrowed the spread between the rate on
ordinary income andthaton capitalgains.
Alternatively, thechange intheratiocouldbetemporary.
First,corporations may have increased dividends asa way
of adjusting leverage in response to developments in the
1980s thatare argued to have encouraged debtfinancing.
Second, therapidappreciation instockprices inthe1980s
areindicative of higherexpected profits. If dividends are
relatedtolong-run profits, thehigherratios ofdividends to
current income observed in the 1980s could decline as
higherlevels ofprofits arerealizedinthe future.
Basedon theseconsiderations, twosetsof weights are
considered, one with a value of w fixed at 0.44 and the
second with a value of w set equalto 0.44 for the period
through 1981 andequalto 0.58 after 1981. Thechoice of
0.58 forthemorerecentyears assumes thattheincrease in
theshareoflong-run profits paidoutin dividends isequal
tohalfoftheobserved riseintheaggregate, dividends-to-
profits ratio.
Chart4 shows theestimates ofG, whichareaffected by
income taxratesaswenasbyinterestrates.Thedarkline
traces the estimated values of G when w is allowed to
change, whilethelightlinetraces theestimateswhen w is
held constant. Thechart shows that the tax advantage of
debtoverequityfinancing increased, onbalance, overthe
last three decades. The incentives were greatestin 1982
andremainedrelatively highthrough1984. Afterdeclining
markedly through 1986, they rebounded some through
1989. Theestimates ofthetaxincentives forleveraging in
1989 were a bit lower than at the start of the decadeand
aboutequalto thelevel prevailing in the mid-1970s.
Toidentify therelative importance income-tax ratesand
thenominal interestrateindetermining movements inG,it
isusefultoseparate thetwoeffects. Toisolate thetaxrate
effects, thetermin braces in (11) commonly isused. This
approach amounts tomeasuring theeffectofincome taxes
holding the before-tax nominal interest rate constant.
Doingthis,however, ignores thetheoretical feedback from
taxratesto thebefore-tax nominal interestrate.
Thediscussion intheprevious section suggests that, in
theory, themoreappropriate approach would betoevaluate
the tax rate effects holding the after-taxnominal interest
rate constant. This says that the marginal effectof debt
financing should beexpressed intermsofthetaxratesand
the after-tax nominal interest rate. 28 Using (2) and (11),
the undiscounted marginal value of leveraging can be
expressed as:
G == (r+p) {I _ (1-tcHw(1 - tp )+(1-w)(1-tk) ] } (12)
1-t p
where (r +p) is the after-tax nominal interest rate on
debt.29 In this expression for G, the term in braces, in
principle, captures theeffects ofchanges intaxratesonthe
incentives forleveraging, including thosedueto changes
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*Weight = 0.44 (1954-1981), weight = 0.58 (1982-1989).
**Weight = 0.44
Federal Reserve Bank of SanFrancisco 9Chart5shows thataccounting fortheeffects oftaxes on
the nominal •. interest ratealters the perspective on how
recenttaxlawchanges have affected incentives forcorpo-
rationsto leverage. Theblacklineis thevalueofthetermin
bracesfrom (B),multipliedbytheaverage value oftheten-
yearTreasury bondrateforJ978 and1979. Thegreen line
isthe value,ofthetermin braces from (12), multiplied by
theaverage oftheafter-taxten-year Treasury ratefor1978
and1979.
BothseriesinChartS, however, show thatthebiasinthe
incometaxratestowarddebtfinancing hasdeclined since
aboutthe mid-l960s.Theupward trendinG, shown inthe
previous chart,then, isdueto theriseinnominal interest
rates. Thatis, based-onthese estimates, higher interest
rates,ratherthan.tax.policy,per se, have increased the
relative attractiveness ofdebtfinancing.
With respectto therecent taxlaw changes, theseries in
Chart 5 indicate that the changes in income-tax rates
following the1981taxreform actboosted theincentives for
leveraging. This would be expected, given thatthemajor
income-tax changes in the 1981 actlowered marginal tax
ratesonordinary income, with themaximum ratereduced
from 70 percent to 50 percent. The increase in the bias
toward debtfinancing from thisact, however, did notdo
much more than offset the decline in the bias inherent
in U.S. income tax policy during the second half of
the 1970s.3o
The relatively strong incentives for leveraging in the
early 1980s primarily reflect the higher nominal interest
rates that prevailed in that period rather thanchanges in
marginal tax rates. Moreover, the subsequent decline in
these incentives from 1984 through 1986 was due to the
drop innominal interest rates,whichessentiallyoffset the
effects of the 1981 taxact. By 1986, thetax advantage of
debt versus equity financing was only.a'Iittleabovethe
levels prevailing inthe1970s(seeChart 4).
The income taxratechangesfoUowingthe 1986 taxact
reduced thebiastoward debtfinancing, asindicatedbythe
decline intheseries plotted inChartS. Although the1986
taxactlowered marginal taxratesonordinary income and
raised them on 'capital gains, which, accordingto<the
discussion above, should 'haveJavol'ed debtfinancing,· it
also lowered the marginal taxrate on corporate profits,
which should have reduced thetaxbiastowarddebtfinanc-
ing.Theestimates inChart5,showinganetdeclineafter
1986, suggest that the changeintheicorporatetax rate
simply dominated. However, the.effectofthe•lawis more
complicated. Thereduction inthemaximummarginal tax
rateon ordinary, personal income from 50 percentto 33
percent (28percent forthehighest taxbrackets) lowered
the average marginal tax rate'for individuals earning
dividend income bymuch more thantheaverage marginal
tax rate for individuals earning interest income. Asa
result, theestimated taxincentives forleveraging were not
boosted much bythelower taxratesonordinary, personal
income. In fact, in thecaseof thegreenline in Chart5,
which takes intoaccount theeffects oftaxratesonnominal
interest rates, theneteffect ofthechanges inpersonal-tax
rates was to reduce the incentives for leveraging, and to
reinforce theeffect ofthelower corporate tax-rate. Thisis
notaresultthatwould have beenanticipated based onthe
model presented above, in which marginal tax rates on
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10 EconomicReview /Fall1990TaxIncentives and Leverage
The discussion in this section turns to the empirical
evidence on the relationship between income-tax incen-
tivesandtheaggregate, market-value, debt-to-equity ratio
fornonfinancialcorporations. Theanalysis startswith(10),
and the assumption that expected values are based on
lagged observations, except for the marginal taxrates.31
For the empirical analysis, the marginal benefit from
leveraging due to income taxes is represented byG. It is
further assumedthat10takesthe form BI(DIE)f2 I' with
the marginal cost of leveraging hypothesized to be posi-
tively related to the level of leverage. The leverage ratio
(DIE) is the market-value, debt-to-equity ratio plotted in
Chart 2.
Whentheequality in(10)doesnothold,corporations are
assumedto adjust(at a cost)to the difference. Using the
log-linearchangein leverage, the adjustment process can
be expressedas:
IlI0g(DIE)t = bo{1ogGt- 1 - [bl +b210g(DIE)t_l]} + e,
or
IlI0g(DIEv, = bologGt-1+CI+c210g(DIE)t-I+e., (13)
whereGt - I is basedontheten-yearTreasury bond rateat
t-1 andthetaxratesprevailing att. Intheexpressions, bo
is expected to have apositive sign.Thatcoefficient should
reflect the average cost of adjusting leverage, which is
assumed to be constant over time. The coefficient b, is
equal to 10g(BI), so the sign of b, depends on whether
O<BI<l,BI. = lorBI<l. Thismeans thatthe sign ofthe
constanttermin(13), ci =bobl , couldbepositive, negative
or zero. The expected sign of the coefficient on lagged
leverage, C2 = bob2 , is negative. The term e, is a random
disturbance term.
One problem estimating (13) is thatexpost changes in
aggregate corporate leverage reflect not only decisions
regardingdebt and equity financing, but also exogenous
shocks to equity prices. If corporations take their share
prices to be random walks anddo notreact to contempo-
raneous changesin these prices, the change in corporate
leverage in period t that would be related to income-tax
incentives and the marginal cost of leverage could be
expressedas:
IlI0g(DIE)t+b3£llogSPt,
whereSPrepresents aggregate stockprices,andb3 would
be expected to be equal to 1.32 On the other hand, if
changes in stock prices were exogenous and there were
offsettingadjustments to the effects of changes in stock
priceson leverage, b3 couldbe greaterthan1.
FederalReserve Bank of San Francisco
Allowing for stock price shocks, the leverage adjust-
mentequation can be rewritten as:
1l10g(DIE)t = bologGt- 1 + ci + c210g(DIE)t_l
+ b41l10gSPt+u.; (14)
where thechangeinstockpricesisthelogdifference ofthe
S&P500 index.P The coefficient, b4 , is expected to be
negative and of the samemagnitude as b3•
Toallow formoreflexibility in the short-run dynamics
ofthe adjustmentin corporate leverage, laggedvalues for
thelog changes in G 'andin DIE wereincluded in (14).
Laggedchangesin leverage weresignificant, but lagged
values of the change in tax incentives were not. The
regression results in the table werederivedby including
the first and second lagged values for the change in
leverage.
Theresultsinthefirst columnofthattableshow thatthe
coefficients have theexpected signs.Thecoefficient forG
is positive and statistically significant, whilethe one for
laggedleverage is negative and significant. The positive
signon theconstanttermindicates thatBI isestimated to
be less than one. The coefficient on the change in stock
nprices is significantly different from zero, and its absolute
value is greater than one, which suggests that corporations
may attempt to offset some of the the effect of stock price
changes that occur during a quarter.>' The empirical
results are very similar whether Gisdefinedusing thefixed
valueofwor allowing wtochange after1981. Thestatistics
in the table are derived assuming the weight, w, changes.
These results, then, are consistent with the hypothesis
that market-value leverage among non-financial corpora-
tions is affected by the difference between the leverage
gains related to income taxes and the net cost of other
factors. Of central interest to this paper is whether that
relationship shifted during the 1980s. Such a shift should
be reflected in the values of the coefficients in (14). For
example, a larger estimated constant term for more recent
years would be consistent with developments not directly
related to income-tax factors in the 1980s, on balance,
favoring more debt financing relative to equity financing
than was the case in earlier years.
Data on the net issuance of equity by nonfinancial
corporations in Chart I suggests that a shiftin the relation-
ship might haveoccurred around 1984.The Quandt (1958)
likelihood method also was employed to help identify the
most likely date for a shiftin the leveragerelationship. The
test indicates that alikely break inthe1980soccurred in the
latter part of 1985.
Toevaluatethe statistical significance ofthe break in the
relationship, the results from the Quandt test were used.
Accordingly, a bivariate dummy variable was used to test
for a change in the constant term after the third quarter of
1985. The coefficient on the dummy variable, d85, in
Column 2 of the table is statistically significant. The
estimatedincrease in theconstant term indicates that, even
on a market-value basis, changes in corporate leverage
have been larger in recent years than would be expected
given stock price movementsand income taxincentives for
leveraging.
Toevaluatethe extent towhichcontrolling fortheeffects
of income-tax incentives forleveraging makes a difference
to this results, the leverageequation wasestimated without
G and lagged leverage. A comparison of the statistics for
the dummy variable in Columns 2 and 3 shows that the
estimated shift is smaller and only marginally significant
when only changes in stock prices are taken into account.
At the same time, the results in Column 4 indicate that
controlling for the effects of changes in stock prices is
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important. When the change in stock prices is not in-
cluded, theestimatedcoefficient for d85 is not statistically
significant. 35 As also can be seen from the results in
Column 4, income-tax incentives explain a fairly small
portion of the quarterly change.in aggregated, market-
value leverage among nonfinancial corporations.
The regression results, then, suggest that changes in
market-value corporate leverage did increase significantly
in thelatter part of the 1980s, and that influences beyond
income-tax incentives contributed to the increase. This
result combined with the dataon the estimated income-tax
advantage ofdebt shown inChart 4 suggest that changes in
income-tax incentives for leveraging were not the impetus
for the rise in corporate restructuring in the second half of
the 1980s.Asshown in Chart 4, in the latter part of the
1980sthe estimated income-tax incentives for corporate
leveraging were low relative to the first part of the decade
and a bit lower on average than in the latter part of the
1970s.. The other influences that contributed to the higher
leverage could be those discussed in the introduction and
identified in other studies as contributing to the surge in
corporate restructuring in the second part of the 1980s.
While changes in income-tax incentives may not have
spurred the much discussed rise in corporate restructuring
in the second part of the 1980s, the relatively high esti-
mated income-tax advantage of debt overequity financing
in the first half of the 1980s may have contributed to a
higher average level of leverage over the decade. The
strong tax-incentives in the first part of the decade should
haveresulted in higher leverage than if the incentives had
remained at the levels prevailing in 1978 and 1979.
To estimate how much the tax incentives might have
affected corporate leverageduring the 1980s, two dynamic
simulations were conducted using the historical relation-
shipofthechange inaggregate, market-value, nonfinancial
corporate leverage to income-tax incentives and lagged
leverage. The simulations were run beginning in 1980. For
one simulation G took on its historical values and in the
other G wasset equal to its average valueover the 1978-79
period. The simulation results show an average level of
market-value leverage for the 1980s that is about five
percentage points higher with the historical movement in
income-tax incentives than isthecase whentheincome-tax
incentives are held at the levels prevailing in the latter part
of the 1970s.
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Income-tax incentives forcorporate leverage are afunc-
tionofnominal interest rates as well as income-tax rates.
The estimates of income-tax incentives for leveraging
indicate that nominal interest rates have been important.
Over the past 25 years, the rise in interest rates has
accounted fortheestimated netincrease intheincome-tax
biasfavoring debtover equity financing.
Even during the1980s, which were punctuatedbymajor
changesinincome-taxrates,theswingsinnominal interest
rateshadasignificant impact ontheestimated income-tax
advantage of debtfinancing. Inthefirst halfofthe1980s,
highnominal interest rates raisedthe income-tax advan-
tage of debt versus equity financing for corporations
relative to the levels prevailing in the second partof the
1970s. The subsequent net drop in interest rates reduced
theincome-tax advantage inthesecond halfofthe 1980s to
levels thatgenerally were notmuch different from those in
the latter part of the 1970s. This pattern suggests that
income-tax incentives persewere notthecatalysts forthe
sizeable netreductions inequity associated with corporate
restructuring beginning in 1984. Nevertheless, the rela-
tively high.income-tax incentives for leveraging inthefirst
part of the decade should have encouraged more debt
financing relative to equity financing and should have
contributed to a measurably higher average level oflever-
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
ageoverthedecade thanwould have beenthecaseifthose
incentives had remained at their lower pre-1980s level.
While income-tax incentives maynothave provided the
impetus forcorporate restructuring in the second part of
the1980s, accounting fortheireffectdoes helptoreconcile
to some extent the difference between the pictures pre-
sented bythedataonbook-value andmarket-value lever-
age s .Itis somewhat surprising thata marked shift toward
debtfinancing inthe1980s isnotobvious whenlooking at
aggregate, market-value leverage for nonfinancial corpora-
tions. However, evidence forsuchashift isfound when the
change in market-value corporate leverage is weighed
against thechanges in thebenefits andcosts of leverage.
When the effects of income-tax incentives aretakeninto
account, along withtheeffects ofchanges instock prices,
changes in market-value corporate leverage are signifi-
cantly largerinthesecond halfofthe 1980s. This result is
consistent witha shift to debtfinancing thatis related to
developments otherthanchanges inincome-tax incentives.
While theregression analysis does notidentify thefactors
that have boosted leverage, other studies suggest that
financial innovation andderegulation, an easing of anti-
truststandards, aswell asanincrease infree cash flow may
have beenimportant influences.
131. The 1986 act provided fora reduction inthemaximum
marginal tax rate on ordinary, personal income from 50
percentto33percent, areduction inthemaximum corpo-
rate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent, and an
increase inthemaximum taxrate oncapital gainsfrom 20
percentto33 percent.
Provisions ofthe1981 and1986taxactsalso affected non-
debt tax shields. For example, the 1981 act increased
investment incentives likeaccelerated depreciation and
taxcredits onequipment, while the198? actreduced an~
eveneliminated certain non-debt taxshields. These provi-
sions of the 1981 act tended to reduce incentives for
leveraging andthose ofthe1986 acttended tomake debt
financing more attractive.
2. Gertler and Hubbard (1989) and Summers (1989), .for
example, argue that financial innovations like the :Ise
in junk bonds, which facilitated corporate restructuring,
probably were more important than tax rate changes .to
the rise in corporate debt. Auerb~ch (1989a,b) als~ dl?-
countstheimportance ofchanges In taxrates totherise In
corporate borrowing. Jensen (1987) discuss.es the other
factorsmentioned inthetext, with anemphasis ontherole
offreecash flow. Also seeJensen (1988). Free cashflow is
definedasthatportion ofcash flow(profits plusdeprecia-
tion)thatcannot be reinvested inthefirm profitably.
3. The estimate ofthemarket value ofnonfinancial corpo-
rate equity is taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts.
Market-value corporate debt isthesum ofthefacevalue
of short-term debtfrom theFlow ofFunds andanestimate
ofthemarket value oflong-term debt.The market value of
long-term debtisestimated bycapitalizing thedifference
between gross nonfinancial corporate interest expenses
and interest expenses onshort-term debtbytheaverage
corporate bondrate. The estimates ofleverage represent
end-of-quarter figures.
4. Bernanke and Campbell (1988) and Strong (1988),
using different measures of aggregated corporate leve~­
age, also find that market-value leverage among non~l­
nancial corporations did notincrease much onbalance In
the 1980s.
5. In a two period model, distinguishing bet.ween divi-
dends and capital gains is somewhat contrived. Also,
unless t =tk other considerations not explicitly in the
model afene~ded toexplain whyprofits would notbepaid
out intheform subjecttothelower taxrate.
6. With VE>I, it ispossible forthe initial investor to issue
debt suchthata>1. Inthatcase, the initial investor pre-
sumably would have to pay taxes on the proceeds in
excess ofthebook-value ofequityinPeriod 1.
7. This differs from the assumption in Hochman and
Palmon (1985) inwhich theinterest rate ondebtisfixed for
a given expected interest rate.
8. This would not necessarily be the case if the initial
investors financed the entire project and merely desig-
nated a portion ofI asdebt sinceit must bethecasethat
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NOTES
(YIl)?:.Rfor a!1 equityfinancin~ t.o. b~ feasible. Iftheoriginal
investordesignated alloftheinitial Investmentasdebt, the




The nominal before-tax rate-of-return on0' alsowould be
R.The measured rate-of-return on I, whichwould repre-
sentthebook-value ofdebt,would be (YII)?..R.
The assumption thatthedebtisheldby individuals other
than theoriginal investor als? altersthetax ef!ects ofdebt
financing andthecomparative s~atlcs Involving cha~ges
intheinflation rate andthemarginal tax rates. The differ-
encesarisebecause, with outside debt holders, aportion
ofthegrossincome from theprojectcannot be sheltered
from double taxation and because the rate-of-return on
thedebt varies.
9. The expression forthemarginal taxeffectw~en debtis
used to replace existing equityis somewhat dlf.ferent. ~n
thatcase theinitial investor canbeassumed toInvest lin
the project before issuing debt. If VE>I, then, replacing
the initial funds (the equity) with debt will involve capital
gains realized in Period 1. The tax on the capital gains
would reduce themarginal benefit from usingdebt when
replacing existing equity relative totheeffectin(5). Using
Eatorepresent thebook-value ofequity, which isequal toI
withallequity financing, and EM to represent the mark~t­
value of equity, which is equal to V E with all equity
financing, the marginal effect from replacing equity with
debt is
, _ R{(1-tp)-(1-tcHw(1-tp)+(1-w)(1-tk )]}
g - 1+r
(EM - Ea)tk (5')
- EM <g.
Strictly speaking, (5') represents themarginal effectfrom
leveraging onthevalue of thefirm plusthe wealth of the
initial investor. The lastterm in(5')represents theeffect on
thewealth oftheinitial investor from thetaxation ofcapital
gainsin Period 1.
A similar comolication arises in Hochman and Palmon
(1985). In a model with more than two periods a~~ no
growth inreal assets, afirm would have toIssue additional
debt and paythe proceeds to equity holders inorderto
maintain a constant capital structure. Inthatcase, these
payments to equity holders would be taxed at the per-
sonal tax rate on equity income. A higher tax rate on
personal equity income would workto discourage such
restructuring.
10. Inthe two-period model, with inflation equal to zero,
themarginal value of leveraging is:
r _ (1-tcHw(1-tp)+(1-w)(1-tk )] }
g = 1+r {1 1- i; .
Economic Review I Fall1990However, when the analysis is extended to an infinite
period model with perpetual debtthe interest rate terms
no lonqer ~nter the expression for g. In that case, the
expression IS:
1 (1-tc)[w(1-tp)+(1-w)(1-tk)]
g = - 1-t '
p
which is the Miller (1977) expression for the gains from
leverage pe~ dollarof debt. ~ith an inflation premium in
the nominal Interest rate, theInterest rate terms remain in
the expression forg.
11. Ina Miller (1977) typeworld, tax rates oninterest and
~quit.Y income for the marginal investor are equal and
Inflation doesnotaffectleverage foran individual firm. On
theother hand, Modigliani (1982), allows forbenefits from
diversification, andargues thatthe incentive for leverag-
ing are positively related to inflation. Rangazas and Ab-
dullah (1987) alsoshow thattaxincentives forleveraging
are positively related to nominal interest rates under the
assumption that firms minimize costs. That study, how-
ever, assumes thatthebefore-tax nominal interest rate is
constant fora givenexpected rate of inflation.
12. Hochman and Palmon (1985) also argue that the
theoretical effectsofinflation onleverage areambiguous.
H?wever, theyassume aMiller (1977) typeworld, sotoget
this result they have to introduce into their model other
leverage-related costs. Without suchcosts intheir model
the effects of inflation (without inflation indexation) ar~
unambiguously negative because onlythebracket creep
effectcomes intoplay.
13. See, forexample, Auerbach (1989b) andGertler and
Hubbard (1989).
14. From (2)in thetext,
aR r+p R
at (1-t)2 ="'1=t >0. p p p
15. Another complication in assessing the sign of (7) is
thattheproportions ofprofits distributed asdividends and
capitalgains likelyarerelated tothetax rates on thetwo
typesofincomes. Inpractice, adecrease intp, forexam-
ple,should leadtoalarger portion ofprofits distributed as
dividends-that is,theweight ont p should benegatively
related totp' Inthiscase, aslong asthemarginal taxrate
on capital gains, tk, is less than the marginal tax rate on
ordinary income,.tp, an.increa~e i~ the weight on tp in-
creases the marginal gainfrom ISSUing debt. Thus, even if
the proportion of profits paid out as dividends changes
withtp, (7) remains negative forvalues ofwless than one.
!6. Inthecasewhere debtisusedtoretire existing equity,
Itcanbeseen from theexpression inNote 9thattheeffect
of a change in tk onthemarginal benefit from leveraging
will involve another term.
17. DeAngelo andMasulis (1980) areresponding toMiller
(1977), who argues thattaxconsiderations candetermine
leverage at the aggregate level, without doing soat the
firmlevel. DeAngelo andMasulis argue that, asleverage
Federal Reserve Bankof SanFrancisco
increases, theearnings thatcanbesheltered bynon-debt
shields decline. A~ lev.erage increases, then, themarginal
tax advantage of Issuing debt(netof the loss invalue of
the non-debt shields) should eventually decrease and
cangotozero. This means thatfactors affecting thevalue
ofnon-debt shields canaffect the marginal taxbenefit of
debtfinancing.
DeAngelo and Masulis also point out that inflation can
reduce the value of certain non-debt shields. They note
thatfordepletion anddepreciation allowances thededuc-
tions. are fixed at the time of the relevant investment.
Therefore a rise in inflation andthe nominal income of a
firm would diminish the effects of non-debt shields and
enhance the effect of the debt shield. This effect would
reinforce the positive effects that inflation has on the
incentives for leveraging in (7).
18. Bernanke and Campbell (1988) argue that "near-
bankruptcy" ~osts, suchascurtailment ofprojects dueto
alackoffunding, alsocanserve to reduce theattractive-
ness of debtfinancing.
19. Information asymmetries exist because afirm insider
like an owner-manager, knows more about the ex ante
investment opportunities, asin Meyer andMujlud (1984),
or abo.ut the ~x post retur~s, as in Williamson (1986).
These Information asymmetries affectthecostofoutside
funds ~e~ause.the interests oftheinsider (agent) often do
notcoincideWith those oftheoutsiders (principals).
20. See Furlong and Keeley (1989).
21. Financing by insiders still would bepreferred, allelse
equal. The amount ofinternal funds presumably would be
related tothenetworth of insiders.
22. Thetax effects relate strictlyto the firms choicebe-
tween debt andequityandnotnecessarily tothechoice
between inside andoutside financing.
23. The expression forthe taxincentive fordebtfinancing
becomes:
G=R{(1-tp;)-(1-tc)[w(1-tpe)+(1-w)(1-tk)]},
where tp;isthepersonal taxrate oninterest income andtp
IS the personal tax rate ondividends. e
24. This approach isused inWright (1969) andRangazas
and Abdullah (1987), though the latter use the average
rate based on dividend income for both interest and
dividendincome.
By using gross adjusted income categories, rather than
income actually taxed, thisapproach should overstate the
marqinal tax rates. Also, using only data on personal
Income tax rates couldoverstate the average rate given
thatcertain holders ofdebtandequity areargued toface
veryloworeven zero marginal taxrates (see, forexample,
Summers (1989), Auerbach (1989b), King and Fullerton
(1984)). Nevertheless, theestimates of tax rates oninter-
estanddividendincome should be useful forexamining
the m~vements intheincome-tax incentive forleveraging
overtime.
1525. See How Capital Gains Tax Rates AffectRevenues:
The Historical Evidence.
26. SeeKingandFulierton (1984), page 222.
27. See, for example, Rangazas and Abdullah (1987).
28. Gandolfi.(1982) and Rose (1986) show that, with
taxes on capital gains(and tk<tp ) and depreciation al-
lowances based on historical costs, the tax-amended
Fisher equation is more complicated than. the Darby
(1975) respecification.
29. Asareminder,theavere.ge tax rates on interest and
dividends are estimated separately. Following the nota-
tion inNote23, (12) is
G=(r+p){1- (1-tc)[w(1-tpe)+(1-w)(1-tk )] }.
1-tpi
30. This decline for the most partreflects the impactof
bracket creepon income tax rates andsome rise in the
averagemarginal taxrate oncapital gains.
31. Changes inthestatutory taxrates areknown ahead of
time,though exactincome distributions arenot.
32. In this case, firms would make decisions regarding
debt andequity based onthelevel of stockpricesatthe
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beginning of theperiod. The changein leverage can be
rewritten as
(OIE)t o, NtSPt- 1
log[ (0IE)t-1 ] = log( 0t-1 ) - log( N
t








tworight-hand-side terms are theones thatwould reflect
thedecisions offirms.
33.The specification in (14) raises the issue of simul-
taneity bias, sincechanges in leverage can affect stock
prices. However, it seems reasonable thatthe dominant
channel ofcausationisfrom exogenous shocks toprices
affecting the market value of equity, and, thus, market-
value leverage.
34. The magnitude ofthecoefficient alsocouldbedueto
the use of the S&P500 index to measure the change in
stockpricesforall nonfinancial corporations.
35. Lagged values of the change in leverage were not
significant, sotheregression forColumn 4wasestimated
without those variables.
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